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NEW YORK v. BELTON AND ITS EXPANSION OF THE
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
This article analyzes the Supreme Court's holding in New
York v. Belton and the expansion this decision has occasioned
over the search incident to arrest exception to thefourth amend-
ment warrant requirement. The author begins by tracing the de-
velopment of the exception through various court decisions over
the years. Thereafter, Belton is examined in the context of
prior Supreme Court decisions which had been viewed as the
precedential authority when dealing with searches incident to ar-
rests. The article concludes with a comparison between Bel-
ton's holding pertaining to warrantless container searches and
prior Supreme Court decisions addressing this subject area.
I. INTRODUCTION
In New York v. Belton,' the United States Supreme Court defined
the permissible scope of an automobile search incident to the lawful
arrest of its recent occupants to include the passenger compartment of
the vehicle and any opened or closed containers therein. 2 Prior to Bel-
ton, the Court had confined the permissible scope of the search inci-
dent exception 3 to encompass only the person of the arrestee and the
area within the arrestee's immediate control.4 Warrantless container
searches were prohibited before the Belton decision unless the
container was open or of a kind that did not exhibit a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy.'
This comment traces the development of the search incident ex-
ception and the expansion of its permissible scope through Supreme
Court decisions over the years. Belton is analyzed in the context of its
1. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
2. Id at 460-61.
3. In this comment, the search incident to arrest exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement will be referred to as the search incident exception. This
comment primarily deals with the warrantless searching of the area within an
arrestee's control. For a discussion on warrantless searching of the arrestee's per-
son, see C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS § 6.01, at 133-35 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
WHITEBREAD].
4. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
5. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979), overruled in part, United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 n.8 (1977).
See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), rejected,
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). Robbins, decided the same day as
Belton, invalidated the warrantless search of two opaque trash bags found in the
luggage compartment of a station wagon stopped pursuant to the automobile ex-
ception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 453 U.S. at 428-29. The
Robbins Court followed the same rationale as that used in Chadwick and Sanders
to invalidate the search. Id at 424-25.
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predecessor, Chimel v. Calfornia,6 a decision which narrowly inter-
preted the permissible scope of the search incident exception. This
comparison is directed towards any change or expansion that Belton
might occasion upon Chimel's holding. Moreover, additional emphasis
is placed on any part of the Belton decision which may generate confu-
sion with respect to the permissible scope of the search incident excep-
tion. After addressing Belton's impact on this exception, this comment
then compares Belton's holding pertaining to warrantless container
searches with prior decisions addressing this subject area.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEARCH
INCIDENT EXCEPTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution7 recog-
nizes "[tihe right of people to be secure in their persons . . . and ef-
fects" from unreasonable searches.' The amendment was the colonists'
response to the much-hated British writs of assistance and general war-
rants.9 As a general rule, the Supreme Court has held that searches
conducted without warrants are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment, subject to a few specifically established exceptions.' 0 One
of the oldest exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
is the search incident to a lawful arrest."l Although this exception had
always been impliedly recognized under English and early American
law,' 2 its use was subject to various restrictions based on the two under-
lying justifications for the exception: the protection of police officers
from possible injury, and the preservation of destructible evidence.' 3
Courts have focused upon three variables when considering the
reasonableness of a search incident to arrest: (1) the proximity of the
search to the arrest; (2) the geographic scope of the search; and (3) the
intensity with which the search is conducted.' 4 As a general rule, a
6. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
7. The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The entire text of the fourth amendment provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
Id
9. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977).
10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
I1. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, § 6.01, at 133.
12. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where the Court stated: "[T]he
right [ol . . . the Government, [has] always [been] recognized under English and
American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to dis-
cover and seize the fruits or evidence of [the] crime." Id at 392.
13. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, § 6.01, at 133; see also Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
14. See Note, Warrantless Container Searches Under the Automobile and Search Inci-
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search must be contemporaneous to the arrest for it to be reasonable -
a restriction that has remained virtually unchanged over time.' 5 How-
ever, the geographic scope of the search incident exception and the in-
tensity with which it may be conducted have experienced a great deal
of change since the recognition of the exception by early English
courts.
A limited right to utilize the search incident exception did exist at
common law, as exhibited in the leading English decision of Leigh v.
Cole. 16 However, the right to search was specifically qualified and de-
pended on the circumstances of each case. I One commentator, Profes-
sor Bishop, interprets Leigh's holding as restricting the use of the
search incident exception' 8 to situations where the officer feared the
arrestee might escape. 9 Other commentators, such as Pollock and
Maitland, discuss the exception in more absolute terms observing that,
at early common law, the right to search incident to arrest existed when
the arrestee was captured while perpetrating the crime for which he
was charged.2" American courts have followed the observations of Pol-
lock and Maitland21 as well as common law decisions,22 when explain-
ing the origins of the search incident exception.
Three early twentieth century Supreme Court decisions form the
foundation for the search incident exception in the United States. In
United States v. Weeks,23 Carroll v. United States,24 and Agnello v.
United States, 25 the Supreme Court recognized, in dicta, the existence
of the search incident exception. 26 Weeks, the earliest of the three deci-
sions, acknowledged a limited right to effectuate a warrantless search of
dent Exceptions, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 185, 187-88 (1980-81). Intensity refers to
the types of items (specifically containers) which are searched. Id
15. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818,
819 (1969); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). But see United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974) (the Court found a warrantless search and seizure of a prisoner's clothing
ten hours after he was arrested to be contemporaneous to the arrest). However,
Edwards has been limited to settings where prison clothing is unavailable at the
time of the arrest, and has been viewed not to have disturbed the contemporane-
ous requirement of the search incident exception. WHITEBREAD, supra note 3,
§ 6.04, at 138.
16. 6 Cox CRIM. CAS. 329 (1853).
17. Id at 332.
18. 1 J. BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 210, at 152 n.75 (2d ed. 1913).
19. Id at 152.
20. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 579 (2d ed. 1968).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 278 F. 650, 653-54 (N.D.W. Va. 1922).
22. See, e.g., id at 656. In United States v. Wilson, 163 F. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1908)
(the court recognized the common law right to search an arrestee incident to his
arrest).
23. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
24. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
25. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
26. It is important to note that none of the three decisions involved an actual search
incident to arrest situation. However, the Court specifically recognized the exist-
ence of the search incident exception in the United States during its analysis of
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the "person" incident to arrest.27 Eleven years later, in Carroll, the
Court again recognized the right to the search incident exception, this
time extending the right to include items found within the arrestee's
control.28 The Supreme Court in Agnello adopted the dicta from
Weeks and Carroll, but extended the search incident exception to in-
clude the right to search the place where the arrest was consummated. 9
Two years later, in Marron v. United States, 30 the Court upheld the
search of an arrestee's premises when federal agents, while effectuating
an arrest pursuant to a warrant, observed the arrestee committing an-
other crime.3 The Supreme Court, applying the dictum from Agnello,
held that when the arrest is for an offense then occurring on the prem-
ises, the right to search extends to "all parts of the premises used for the
unlawful purpose. 32
In the years that followed, the search incident exception encoun-
tered a variety of interpretations by the Court. Initially, the Court inti-
mated a very limited view of the exception, invalidating warrantless
searches when the officer had sufficient time and information prior to
the search to get a warrant. 33 Moreover, warrantless searches were gen-
erally invalidated when the arresting officer had not observed the crime
for which the defendant was arrested.34
This restricted view of the search incident exception was aban-
doned in Harris v. United States.35 The Harris Court based its test for
judicial review of the exception on the reasonableness of the search,
which in turn depended on the facts and circumstances of each case. 6
However, one year later, the Court implicitly overruled Harris' broad
interpretation in Trupiano v. United States,37 holding that whenever
there exists ample time to secure a warrant, officers must do so before
effectuating a search incident to an arrest. 38 Trupiano's holding was
each case. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
27. United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
28. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
29. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
30. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
31. In Marron, federal agents had secured a warrant authorizing the seizure of liquor
and certain articles used in its manufacture by the defendant. Id at 193-94.
When the agents arrived at the defendant's premises, they observed that the place
was being used for retailing and on-premises consumption of intoxicating liquors.
These activities were illegal during prohibition. Id at 194. The agents, after ar-
resting Marron, conducted a full search of the premises for items described in the
warrant, and in the process, seized an incriminating ledger and other articles not
specifically mentioned in the warrant. Id
32. Id at 199.
33. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931).
34. See id; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 425, 465 (1932).
35. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969).
36. 331 U.S. at 150.
37. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
38. Id at 705. Trupiano is said to be one of the strongest expressions of the doctrine
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. See W. RINGAL, SEARCHES &
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laid to rest in United States v. Rabinowitz39 when the Court returned to
the rule it enunciated in Harris. The Rabinowitz Court noted that the
relevant test for determining the validity of a search incident to an ar-
rest, "is not whether it . . . [was] reasonable to procure a search war-
rant [as Trupiano suggested] but whether the search was reasonable
• . . [which in turn] depends on the facts and circumstances . . . of
each case."4
In 1969, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the Rabinowitz-
Harris reasonableness rule in Chimel v. California. 4 In Chime, the
defendant was arrested, pursuant to a warrant, for the burglary of a
coin store.42 The officers who effectuated the arrest conducted a war-
rantless search of the defendant's home, attic, and garage looking for
fruits or instrumentalities of the crime for which the defendant was
charged. The search turned up numerous coins, which were used as
evidence to convict the defendant on the burglary charge.43 The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction finding the scope of the search
to be unreasonable under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, de-
spite the lawful arrest." The Court formulated a new rule which pre-
scribed the permissible scope of the search incident exception. The
Chimel rule stated that police could conduct warrantless searches inci-
dent to lawful arrests, but were limited to the search of the "arrestee's
person and the area 'within [the arrestee's] immediate control'--con-
struing that phrase to mean the area . . . [where] . . . [an arrestee]
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."45 This
rule resulted from the Court's concern with the arrestee's access to
weapons or destructible evidence during the arrest.46
Chimel had represented the law governing the permissible scope of
the search incident exception prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
New York v. Belton. 47 However, as the rest of this article suggests, the
Belton decision seems to have disregarded the limitations of, and the
justifications for, the rule that Chime! established.
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 12.1 (2d. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
RINGAL].
39. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969).
40. 339 U.S. at 66.
41. 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
42. Id at 753-54.
43. Id. at 754.
44. Id at 768.
45. Id at 763. The Court, in overruling Harris and Rabinowitz, stated that neither
decision was "founded on an unimpeachable line of authority." Id at 760. Some
commentators have viewed Chimel as a decision which overruled many years of
precedent by severely restricting the right of police officers to conduct searches
incident to arrests. See, e.g., Carrington, Chimel v. Calfornia - A Police Re-
sponse, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 559 (1970).
46. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
47. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The Supreme Court, however, in two controversial decisions
after Chimel, implemented a marked change in the rule governing the permissible
scope of a search involving the arrestee's person. It is necessary to discuss these
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III. THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN
NEW YORK v. BELTON
On April 9, 1978 Trooper Nicot of the New York State Police
cases because the Belton Court used the rationales emanating from them to justify
its holding pertaining to container searches.
In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260 (1973), the Supreme Court held that an officer may search incident
to an arrest the person of an arrestee and containers on his person even though the
offense is of a kind that is unlikely to produce dangerous weapons or evidence of
criminal conduct. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Gustafson
v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1973). In both cases, the arrests were based on
traffic violations for which the officers properly effectuated full custodial arrests of
the defendants. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220-21 (1973); Gustaf-
son v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 262 (1973). Before either officer transported his sub-
ject to the police station, he conducted a full search of the arrestee's person, with
both searches turning up narcotics. The Robinson Court upheld the conviction of
the defendant based on the narcotics seized even though the defendant was only
arrested for a traffic violation. The Court reasoned that "[a] custodial arrest of a
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the fourth
amendment; ...[and that] a search incident to [that] arrest requires no addi-
tional justification." United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). Al-
though the Robinson Court recognized that the search incident exception was
based on the need to disarm or to discover evidence, it dismissed the necessity for
showing either of the two justifications when the search involved the person of the
arrestee. Id. The Gustafson Court also upheld a conviction of the defendant
based on the narcotics seized, following the same rationale as that used in Robin-
son to justify the search. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263-66 (1973).
It is important to note that the Robinson and Gustafson decisions only dis-
pensed with the necessity for showing the two justifications for the search incident
exception when the search involved the person of the arrestee. The Court did not
extend this rationale to searches involving the area within the arrestee's immedi-
ate control. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 13, 16 n.10 (1977). This
factor will have important significance when viewing the Belton Court's use of the
Robinson rationale to justify the search of Roger Belton's jacket.
It is also necessary to discuss the automobile exception to the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement because some of the case law contains analysis perti-
nent to the search incident exception. The automobile exception was first
established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Carroll outlined two
requirements that must be shown before a warrantless search of an automobile
will be reasonable. First, the officers must have probable cause to believe the
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Id at 153. Second, exigency
due to the mobility inherent in an automobile must be present. Id.; see C. Moy-
lan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in
Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987, 993 (1976) (illustrating later
cases that more fully exhibit the exigency requirement of the automobile excep-
tion). The Carroll Court's justification for allowing searches of automobiles,
based upon probable cause and exigency, rests on the inherently mobile nature of
the vehicle. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) extended the automobile exception to allow the war-
rantless searching of impounded vehicles at a police station when officers had a
right, pursuant to the automobile exception, to search the vehicle at the place
where it was stopped. Id at 52.
The warrantless searching of containers pursuant to the search incident or
automobile exceptions was frequently sustained prior to the Supreme Court's de-
cisions in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled in part, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157
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stopped an automobile on a New York thruway for traveling at an ex-
(1982). See United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973) (sustained a
search of an attache case found in the arrestee's car as incident to a lawful arrest),
cert. denied 419 U.S. 831 (1974); United States v. Halliday, 487 F.2d 1215 (5th
Cir. 1973) (sustained a search of thirty-one boxes inside a trailer pursuant to the
Carroll exception), reh'g denied, 488 F.2d 552 (1974); United States v. Evans, 481
F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1973) (sustained a search of a footlocker inside an arrestee's car
pursuant to the Carroll exception); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th
Cir.) (sustained a search of an arrestee's brief case as a proper search incident to a
lawful arrest), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
A number of courts, relying on the search incident exception, sustained the
warrantless searching of containers even when the possibility of the arrestee's
gaining possession of a weapon or destructible evidence appeared remote. See
Comment, Broadening the Scope of a Search Incident to CustodialArrest." The Bur-
ger Court's Retreat from Chimel, 24 EMORY L.J. 151, 167 (1975); see also United
States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977) (sustained the warrantless search of a
suitcase after it was taken from the arrestee's possession and while the arrestee
was handcuffed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Ciotti, 469
F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1972) (sustained the warrantless search of a briefcase after it
was taken from the arrestee's possession and while the arrestee was handcuffed),
vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 1151 (1974); United States v. Wysocki, 457
i.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972) (sustained the warrantless search of a box found in a
closet six feet from the arrestee).
Both Chadwick and Sanders, however, substantially limited the right to
search containers pursuant to either the search incident or automobile exception.
Chadwick invalidated a warrantless search of a double-locked footlocker which
took place at a federal building an hour-and-a-half after the owner was arrested at
a train station. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). This search
took place after federal agents had secured the footlocker, pursuant to the auto-
mobile exception, from the trunk of Chadwick's automobile. Id at 3-4. The foot-
locker was then transported to a federal building and searched without either a
warrant or the defendant's consent. Id at 5. The Supreme Court invalidated the
search finding that "luggage [and other containers] . . . [are] repositor[ies] of per-
sonal effects," id at 13, exhibiting a reasonable expectation of privacy which the
fourth amendment protects against warrantless governmental intrusions. Id at 6-
7. Moreover, the Court declined to accept the contention that the automobile
exception should, by analogy, apply to a footlocker and other containers which
are mobile. Id at 13. The Court found the automobile exception to be based on
the diminished expectation of privacy surrounding an automobile, whereas a
much greater expectation of privacy existed in personal luggage and other con-
tainers. Id.
Using the same rationale as it did in Chadwick, the Supreme Court in Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled inpart, United States v. Ross, 102 S.
Ct. 2157 (1982), invalidated the search of a suitcase obtained from the trunk of an
automobile pursuant to the automobile exception. 442 U.S. at 755. In Sanders,
officers had probable cause to believe that a suitcase in the trunk of a taxi they
were following contained marihuana. Id The officers stopped the vehicle, in-
structed the taxi driver to open the trunk, and without a warrant or the owner's
consent, opened the unlocked suitcase discovering over nine pounds of mari-
huana. Id The Court reaffirmed its holding in Chadwick, recognizing that lug-
gage and other containers are common repositories for one's personal effects. Id
at 762. The Court noted that such containers are inevitably associated with a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore are protected by the fourth
amendment from warrantless governmental intrusions. Id While Sanders de-
nied the use of the automobile exception as a blanket justification for searching
containers in a vehicle, the Supreme Court did acknowledge that such searches
would be permitted when the container exhibited a diminished expectation of pri-
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cessive rate of speed.48 The car was occupied by four men, one of
whom was Roger Belton. After asking for the driver's license and re-
gistration, the officer discovered that none of the occupants owned the
vehicle or was related to its owner. Meanwhile, Trooper Nicot smelled
burnt marihuana emanating from the passenger compartment and
spotted an envelope on the floor of the vehicle marked "super gold."49
The officer then instructed the four men to get out of the vehicle, and
placed them under arrest for illegal possession of marihuana.5"
Trooper Nicot read the arrestees their Miranda5" warnings and
searched each of them. He then proceeded to search the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, finding on the back seat a black leather
jacket with zippered pockets that belonged to Belton. The trooper un-
zipped one of the pockets and discovered a packet of cocaine inside.52
Upon this evidence Belton was indicted for illegal possession of a con-
trolled substance. At trial, Belton's motion to suppress the evidence of
cocaine was denied.53 On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search and
seizure.54 The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the search
of Belton's jacket to be unconstitutional.55
IV. THE BELTON DECISION
In New York v. Belton, 56 the primary issue before the Supreme
Court was the constitutionally permissible scope and intensity of a war-
rantless search incident to a lawful custodial arrest of the recent occu-
pant of an automobile.57 Acknowledging the justifications for the
search incident exception, the Court turned to Chimel v. Cal#ornia, 58
recognizing it to be the governing authority for the permissible scope of
such warrantless intrusions.59 The majority found that although the
vacy. Id at 764 n. 13. The Court gave the following examples of the kinds of
containers which would exhibit a diminished expectation of privacy: a kit of bur-
lar tools, gun cases, open packages, open luggage, or any container which would,
y its outward appearance, reveal its contents to plain view. Id
48. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).
49. Id at 455-56. The officer associated this envelope with marihuana. Id
50. Subsequent to the arrest, the officer patted each man down and split them into
four separate areas of the freeway where they could not touch each other. Id at
456. The officer then picked up the envelope marked "super gold" from the floor
of the vehicle and discovered that it contained marihuana. Id
51. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
52. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 456 (1981).
53. Id Belton pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of possession of marihuana, preserv-
ing for appeal his claim that the cocaine had been seized in violation of his fourth
and fourteenth amendment rights.
54. Id
55. Id
56. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
57. Id at 457.
58. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
59. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1981). For a discussion of the permis-
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Chimel rule could be simply stated, its application had given courts
some difficulty because the rule allowed for varied interpretations.6 °
The Court found a better approach in the writings of La Fave who
suggested that specific rules (which instruct officers beforehand as to
the propriety of a warrantless search) afford more fourth amendment
protection. 6 ' Therefore, the Court set out to formulate a "bright-line
rule" 62 which would guide officers in their encounters with the search
incident exception.
United States v. Robinson63 was the first case the Supreme Court
turned to, commending that decision for establishing a straightforward
rule regarding the search of a person incident to arrest. The Court
found that the rule in Robinson could be predictably enforced by law
enforcement officials and easily applied by the courts. 64 However, the
Court noted that no straightforward rule, like that in Robinson, had
emerged from the cases litigated on the permissible scope of a search
involving the area within the arrestee's control.65
In an attempt to formulate such a rule, the Belton majority inter-
preted the scope of the area within the arrestee's control to include the
passenger compartment of an automobile when the arrestee was its re-
sible scope of the search incident exception as set forth in Chimel, see supra notes
41-47 and accompanying text.
60. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).
61. La Fave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures"- The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127, 142. La Fave suggests that: "[the
protections of the fourth amendment] can only be realized if the police are acting
under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the
interest of law enforcement." Id
62. This is how the dissenting opinion labels the rule established by the majority.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
63. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
64. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981). The rule enunciated in United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), provides that in the case of a lawful
custodial arrest, the full warrantless search of the arrestee's person is reasonable
under the fourth amendment. Id at 235. The Robinson Court rejected the con-
tention that each case must litigate the question of whether one of the two justifi-
cations for the search incident exception is present. Id However, the Robinson
Court refused to extend this holding to include the area within an arrestees' im-
mediate control. See supra note 47.
65. Prior to Belton, the permissible scope of the search incident exception when an
automobile was involved seemed an unresolved question. This fact is illustrated
by the many inconsistent federal court decisions on the subject. Holdings in such
cases as United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1127 (1981); United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); and United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974), upheld the warrantless search of an auto-
mobile incident to a lawful arrest, while holdings in such cases as United States v.
Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); and United
States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980), invalidated such searches under
comparable factual circumstances.
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cent occupant.66 Accordingly, the Belton Court ruled that when police
officers effectuate a lawful custodial arrest of a recent occupant of an
automobile they may search, contemporaneously therewith, the passen-
ger compartment of the vehicle without a warrant.67 Following from
this conclusion the Belton Court also ruled that police officers may
search the contents of any opened or closed containers within the pas-
senger compartment, noting that an arrestee who can reach the passen-
ger compartment of a vehicle can also reach containers therein.6 The
majority stated that "the justification for the search [of containers] is
not that the arrestee has no privacy interest [in them]. . . , but that the
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest
the arrestee may have."69
Rejecting the contention that some containers might be of the kind
that could neither hold a weapon nor evidence of the arrestee's crimi-
nal conduct, the Court adhered to the Robinson rationale that "a custo-
dial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the fourth amendment: that intrusion being lawful, a
search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."7 Ap-
plying its "bright-line rule," the Supreme Court upheld the search of
Belton's jacket.71
A strong dissenting opinion was delivered by Justices Brennan and
66. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). The Court's rationale for allowing
the search of the passenger compartment, incident to a lawful arrest of its recent
occupant, was because its "reading of the cases [including Chimel] ... [sug-
gested] that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of [a] passenger compart-
ment. . .[were] within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary item.'" Id
67. Id.
68. Id at 460-61. The Court noted that containers included "any object capable of
holding another object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, con-
soles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as
well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like." Id at 460-61 n.4. The Court
did note, however, that its holding did not extend to the trunk of an automobile.
Id
69. Id. at 461. The Court analogized the search of containers in a passenger compart-
ment of an automobile to the type of search that Chimel found permissible - the
search of "drawers within the arrestee's reach," where the arrestee might obtain a
weapon or destructible evidence. Id
70. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
71. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981). Two concurring opinions were
delivered in Belton, one by Justice Rehnquist and one by Justice Stevens. Justice
Rehnquist concurred in the majority's opinion because the Court was unwilling to
overrule its decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and because the Court
did not consider this case in the context of the automobile exception. New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
concurred in the majority's holding for the same reasons he stated in his dissent-
ing opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 444 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), rejected, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Marshall. 2 The dissenters argued that the majority, in attempting to
formulate a "bright-line rule," turned their backs on the underlying
policy justifications of Chime," and therefore, greatly expanded the
permissible scope of the search incident exception with neither the
precedential basis nor factual background to justify their conclusions.74
Justices Brennan and Marshall found the majority's expansion of
Chime? both analytically unsound and inconsistent with prior Supreme
Court decisions addressing the permissible scope for searching the area
within the arrestee's control. 75 In closing, the dissenters noted that the
majority's holding left many unanswered questions, and more impor-
tantly, "because the Court's new rule abandons the justifications under-
lying Chimel, it offers no guidance to . . . [police officers] seeking to
work out these answers for [themselves]. 76
V. BELTON'S EXPANSION OF THE CHIMEL DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton, 77 manifests
the Court's strong desire to establish a "bright-line rule" prescribing
the permissible scope and intensity78 of the search incident exception
when the arrest involves the recent occupant of an automobile. The
rule that Belton elucidates is that an officer may search, incident to the
lawful custodial arrest of the recent occupants of an automobile, the
passenger compartment of the vehicle, and any open or closed containers
therein.79 The opinion demonstrates the Court's attempt at making law
enforcement more efficient by establishing standardized criteria for of-
ficers to relate to when confronted with search incident situations in-
volving a vehicle. 0 Although this underlying basis is not without
merit, the rule that Belton expounds disregards the Court's past asser-
72. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
73. Id at 463.
74. Id at 466.
75. Id at 468. The dissenters noted that prior case law had demonstrated that the
crucial question under Chimel was "not whether the arrestee could ever have
reached the area that was searched, but whether the arrestee could have reached it
at the time of the arrest and search." Id at 469. If the arrestee could not have
reached the area searched at the time of the arrest, then a warrantless search of
that area was impermissible. Id
76. Id at 469-70. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
77. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
78. Scope refers to the area within which a search incident to a lawful arrest may be
conducted. Intensity pertains to what may be searched in the permissible area of
the search incident exception, specifically referring to containers that are either
closed or open. See Note, Warrantless Container Searches Under the Automobile
and Search Incident Exceptions, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 185, 187-88 (1980-81).
79. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (emphasis added).
80. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Although the Belton Court does not
specifically so state, it may be assumed that its holding only extends to vehicles
and not to situations where an arrestee was the recent occupant of a dwelling.
This assumption is based on the terminology used in the Belton decision, and on
the Court's prior determination that automobiles exhibit a diminished expectation
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tions, 8 while leaving open an aftermath of unanswered questions82
which will undoubtedly incite a multitude of litigation that Chimel's
holding may not have provoked.
Prior to the Belton decision, both federal and state courts were in-
consistent in their holdings as to whether the prescriptions in Chimel
encompassed the search of the interior of an automobile when the ar-
restees were its recent occupants.83 The Belton Court has attempted to
alleviate this conflict by establishing its "bright-line rule"; however, in
the process it appears that the Court did not remain altogether faithful
to either the limitations that Chimel fashioned or to the strictures that
the fourth amendment commands on the subject.84 Although the Bel-
ton Court claims that it left Chimel and its underlying principles in-
tact,85 its holding, on its face, exhibits a marked disregard for the
limitations of, and the justifications for, the rule that Chime!
established.
of privacy. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); see also
WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, § 7.03, at 145-46.
81. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where the Court stated: "[t]he mere
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify
disregard of the fourth amendment." Id at 393.
82. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469-70 (1981) (Brennan, J. and Marshall,
J., dissenting). The dissenters elaborate on many of the unanswered questions the
Belton decision incites, some of which include:
[Hlow long after the suspect's arrest . . . may [the search] validly be
conducted[?] [F]ive minutes after the. . . [suspect's arrest]? Thirty min-
utes? Three hours? Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in
close proximity to the car when the search is conducted? [Wihat is
meant by 'interior' [of the car]? Does it include locked glove compart-
ments,. . . interior. . . door panels. . . [areas] under the floor boards?
Id Judging from the Belton decision, it seems that any kind of container in a
vehicle may be searched regardless of its location or inability to hold a weapon or
evidentiary item.
83. For an example of federal court inconsistencies, compare United States v. Sand-
ers, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding the search of a passenger compart-
ment of an automobile incident to the arrest of its recent occupant), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981) and United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977)
(same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) and United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666
(5th Cir. 1973) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974) with United States v.
Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980) (invalidating the search of a passenger com-
partment when the arrestee was its recent occupant), vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981)
and United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
For an example of state court inconsistencies, compare Hinkel v. Anchorage,
618 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1980) (upholding the search of a passenger compartment of
an automobile incident to the arrest of its recent occupant) with Ulesky v. Florida,
379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. App. 1979) (invalidating the search of the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile when the arrestee was its recent occupant).
84. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
85. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 n.3 (1981), where the Court states:
"[o]ur holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's prin-
ciples in this particular and problematic context. It in no way alters the funda-
mental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of
searches incident to lawful custodial arrests." Id
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The Chime! rule,86 designed to protect arresting officers and to pre-
serve destructible evidence, 7 placed a temporal and spatial limitation
on the search incident exception, excusing noncompliance with the
fourth amendment warrant requirement only when the search was sub-
stantially contemporaneous with the arrest, 88 and confined to an area
where the arrestee might lunge, reach or grab for a weapon or destruc-
tible evidence. 89 The Belton Court endeavors to expand the Chime!
rule by enlarging both the spatial and temporal limitations that Chimel
prescribed.
Belton first expands the spatial limitations of Chime! by finding
"the area 'within the . . . [arrestee's] immediate control'" to encom-
pass the passenger compartment of an automobile that an arrestee re-
cently occupied.9" The majority interprets the interior of a vehicle, in
all situations, to be within the lunge, reach or grasp of an arrestee. 9'
Although under certain limited circumstances this assumption might be
valid, 9 in most situations when the arrestee has been taken out of the
vehicle and arrested it is almost impossible to perceive how he could
gain access back into the vehicle to obtain a weapon or destructible
evidence while under the close watch and restraint of armed law en-
forcement officials. 93 Therefore, the Belton Court has established a
dangerous precedent to be uniformly applied by officers and the courts,
when in many instances, the Court's justification for allowing the
search of the passenger compartment will not be present. Moreover, by
allowing officers to search the interior of an automobile, regardless of
whether the arrestee could actually reach a weapon or evidentiary item,
the Court is permitting inexcusable noncompliance with the fourth
amendment and completely disregarding the justifications for the rule
86. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
87. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
88. See Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964).
89. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977).
90. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
91. This statement is interpreting Belton in the context of Chimel. See Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
92. It is not entirely impossible to believe that a factual situation could arise where the
arrestee is able to lunge into the interior of the car, thereby obtaining a weapon or
evidentiary item. For instance, a situation could occur where the arrestee has not
been handcuffed and is standing by an open door of the vehicle and the weapon
or evidentiary item is within reach on the front seat. However, the frequency in
which such a factual situation would arise seems, at best, remote.
93. One commentator has severely criticized such an extension of Chimel while recog-
nizing that lower courts, which had not been enthusiastic about Chimel's limita-
tions, responded to the spatial restriction by viewing "every arrestee as a
combination acrobat and Houdini who might well free himself from his restraints
and suddenly gain access to some distant [and logically unreachable] place." 2 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.3,
at 414 (1978). For instance, when the doors of a vehicle are closed, or when the
arrestee is handcuffed or a good distance from the vehicle, his gaining access back
into the vehicle to obtain a weapon or evidentiary item seems a remote possibility.
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that Chimel established.94
The facts in Belton also make it clear that the Court substantially
expanded the Chimel rule, upholding a search into areas that the ar-
restees, at most, only had a remote chance to reach. The facts illustrate
that all of the arrestees must have been some distance from the vehicle
at the time of the arrest, making it almost impossible for them to lunge
into the interior of the vehicle without first being restrained by Officer
Nicot.95 Even a broad interpretation of Chimel's holding would not
permit the use of the search incident exception under these cir-
cumstances.
96
Although some lower courts, prior to Belton, had upheld the
search of a passenger compartment of an automobile incident to the
arrest of its recent occupant,97 many had done so relying on other ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement,98 such as plain view,99 to justify
the search. No Supreme Court decison, after Chimel, had ever ex-
tended the permissible scope of the search incident exception to include
the passenger compartment of a vehicle. Therefore, the Supreme Court
in Belton has expanded the spatial limitation that Chimel prescribed for
the search incident exception, with neither the factual circumstances 1°°
94. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) where the Court stated, "we cannot
be true to [the fourth amendment] and excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate
that the exigencies of the situation make the course imperative." Id at 763 (quot-
ing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
95. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
96. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), where the Court exhibited a recu-
sant attitude towards the searching of areas that the arrestee only had a remote
chance of reaching:
No consideration relevant to the [f]ourth [a]mendment suggests any
point of rational limitation once the search is allowed to go beyond the
area from which the ... [arrestee] might obtain weapons or evidentiary
items. The only reasoned distinction is one between a search of the person
arrested and the area within his reach on the one hand, and more extensive
searches on the other.
Id at 766 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
97. See United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1127 (1981); United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1063 (1978); United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 831 (1974). But see United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir.
1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th
Cir. 1980).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1127 (1981).
99. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 211-26 for a good discussion of the
plain view exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
100. The Chimel Court recognized that it is the factual circumstances of each case that
determines if a search is reasonable. The Court stated: "'[the recurring questions
of reasonableness of searches' depend upon 'the facts and circumstances - the
total atmosphere of the case'. . . . Those facts and circumstances must be viewed
in light of established [flourth [a]mendment principles." Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969) (citations omitted). This language from Chimel also im-
plies that the Chimel Court would not approve of a uniform rule, like that estab-
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nor the precedential case law' to justify its holding.
Belton's expansion of the Chimel rule to include the passenger
compartment of a vehicle also invites many questions pertaining to
what the search of the interior compartment may encompass. Can of-
ficers search areas under the seats, behind the dashboards or inside the
door panels? By broadly stating that officers may search "the passenger
compartment," 2 and by failing to prescribe any limitations on such a
search, the court has left it for law enforcement officials to determine,
in their discretion, whether such a search is reasonable.' 3 Such adhoc
determinations are clearly prohibited by the fourth amendment and
Supreme Court decisions enforcing it."° Therefore, the Belton Court's
attempt to afford more constitutional protection to arrestees through a
"bright-line rule" failed on its own terms by permitting law enforce-
ment officials to make discretionary decisions concerning a search inci-
dent to an arrest.
The second limitation of Chimel that Belton expands is the tempo-
ral restriction. Chimel recognized that in order for a warrantless search
to be valid, it had to be substantially contemporaneous in time and
place with the arrest.10 5 Although some lower federal courts had liber-
ally construed Chime's contemporaneous requirement, 106 the Supreme
Court had adhered to the stricter standard established in Chimel invali-
lished in Belton, which purports to apply regardless of the factual circumstances
of each case. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (finding the reasona-
bleness of a search incident to arrest to depend upon the factual circumstances of
each case); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) (same); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 369 (1964) (same).
101. No Supreme Court decision after Chimel had ever permitted a search as extensive
as that in Belton.
102. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
103. It is unclear whether a search of the areas under the seats, behind the dashboard,
or inside the door panels would be considered reasonable. The limitations of
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), would prohibit the search of these
areas under such circumstances. Whether under Belton such a search would be
allowed remains to be seen.
104. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977), where the Court recognized
that one of the purposes of the fourth amendment is to protect against ad hoc
determinations by officers as to whether they should or should not search. The
Court in Chadwick stated that: "The judicial warrant has a significant role to play
in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more
reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law
enforcement officer, 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.'" Id
105. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969).
106. See United States v. Wyatt, 561 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1977) (upheld a search five
minutes after an arrest as substantially contemporaneous); United States v. John-
son, 561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) (upheld the search
of the premises after the arrestees had been constrained); United States v. Mason,
523 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upheld the search of a suitcase found in a closet in
the same room where the arrestee stood handcuffed). But see United States v.
Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1977) (arrestee shackled to a bed, search of his
billfold not incident to arrest); United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973)
(arrestee surrounded by six officers; search of a closet not incident to arrest);
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dating all searches remote in time or place to the arrest.107 However,
the Belton decision permits an officer to search the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile incident to the arrest of the automobile's "re-
cent occupant."' 8 The Court's use of the phrase "recent occupant,"
coupled with its failure to prescribe any limitations for the application
of this terminology,' 09 intimates an expansion of the contemporaneous
requirement that Chimel dictated. Chimel's temporal restrictions only
permitted the search of the area where the arrest occurred if the search
was conducted immediately after the arrest, and if the arrestee was
present in the area desired to be searched." 0 The Belton standard of
"recent occupant" may allow searches far more remote in time and
place than the strictures in Chimel would permit."' Although subse-
quent case interpretation may limit the "recent occupant" terminology,
United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969) (arrestee handcuffed, search
of area where arrested invalid).
107. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30, 33 (1970); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). But see United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974); supra note 15 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled in
part, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), while not addressing a search
incident situation, affirmed its recognition of the strict contemporaneous require-
ment of Chimel when it stated, in dictum, that the area of control for the purposes
of the search incident exception is that area within the reach of the arrestee at the
time of the search, and not the area within the arrestee's reach at the time of
arrest. 442 U.S. at 763 n. 11. This language implies that the Supreme Court, until
Belton, had not sanctioned searching an area where an arrest took place, if the
search was remote in time to the arrest or was conducted in an area the arrestee
could not possibly have reached at the time of the search. Moreover, it would
seem that the Court in Sanders would not have sanctioned the search that took
place in Belton because Belton permitted a search into areas (the passenger com-
partment of a vehicle) and containers that the arrestees could not possibly have
reached at the time of the search. The language in Sanders also implies that the
Court would not sanction the search of an area where the arrest took place if the
arrestee had been handcuffed, placed in a police car or removed in some way from
the area desired to be searched. But see supra note 106 and accompanying text
(showing that some lower federal courts have upheld such searches).
108. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
109. The Belton Court failed to establish any time constraints limiting the phrase "re-
cent occupant." For example, how long after the arrest of an occupant of a vehi-
cle will the occupant still be considered a recent occupant; 5 minutes after?, an
hour after? The Court also failed to give any limitation concerning how far the
arrestee can be moved before the right to search the passenger compartment
would be lost.
110. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969).
111. The term "recent occupant" implies a far more liberal standard than the contem-
poraneous requirement of Chimel. A broad interpretation of this terminology
may allow a search of the passenger compartment after the arrestee is handcuffed,
or a good distance from the vehicle, or even in situations when the arrestee has
been placed in a police car. Under all of these examples the arrestee could still be
considered a recent occupant of the vehicle. Therefore, since Chimel's standards
would not permit a search under the aforementioned examples, it is a logical con-
clusion that the Belton decision has substantially expanded the contemporaneous
requirement prescribed in Chimel.
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for the time being Be/ton appears to have substantially expanded the
contemporaneous requirement that Chimel prescribed.
VI. BELTON'S HOLDING WITH RESPECT TO
CONTAINER SEARCHES
A third area that Belton has expanded the search incident excep-
tion to include is the search of open or closed containers in the passen-
ger compartment of a vehicle an arrestee had recently occupied.' 12 The
Belton majority bases this holding on Chimel's assertion that officers
could search drawers that were in front of the arrestee at the time of the
arrest, 1 3 and on the rationale of United States v. Robinson"'4 which
allows the search of containers found on the person of the arrestee at
the time of the arrest.' The Court dispenses with the argument that
arrestees have a legitimate expectation of privacy in containers inside
the passenger compartment of their vehiclesII6 by stating that a "lawful
custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the ar-
restee may have.""' 7 Belton completely disregards the existing law on
the subject of vehicle container searches established in United States v.
Chadwick, ' Arkansas v. Sanders, 119 and Robbins v. California. 120
112. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
113. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
114. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
115. Id at 236.
116. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978), where the Supreme Court
recognized that one who owns or possesses property may retain a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in that property.
117. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981).
118. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
119. 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled in part, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157
(1982).
120. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), rejected, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982). Robbins involved an auto search subsequent to a Carroll stop. Hav-
ing probable cause to believe the defendant's vehicle contained marihuana, the
police searched it finding a small quantity of marihuana and paraphernalia asso-
ciated with its use. 453 U.S. at 422. After placing the defendant in the patrol car,
the officers searched the tailgate of the defendant's station wagon finding, in the
luggage compartment, two sealed opaque trash bags which they opened and
found to contain thirty pounds of marihuana. The Supreme Court invalidated the
search adhering to its decisions in Chadwick and Sanders, which held that a de-
fendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy interest in containers likely to hold
personal effects, whether found in an automobile or some other place, and there-
fore such containers could not be searched without a warrant. Id at 424-25. The
Robbins Court found these two opaque trash bags to constitute closed containers
which exhibited the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy. Id at 428-29.
Therefore, the Court held that once the officers took the containers under their
exclusive control, they could not validly search them without a warrant. Id.
Since this comment was written, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). In Ross, the Supreme Court held that when police
officers have probable cause to search an entire vehicle without a warrant, they
may also search any container or package within the vehicle that might conceal
the object of the search. The Court noted that the permissible scope of such war-
rantless searches would be governed by the object of the search and the place for
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In reviewing Robbins, which reaffirmed the holdings in Chadwick
and Sanders, it appears that the Court's rationale for invalidating war-
rantless searches of containers found in vehicles is that these containers
are repositories of personal effects exhibiting a legitimate expectation of
privacy against warrantless governmental intrusions.I2  Therefore, as
the Court noted in Robbins, unless the container is of the type that its
"contents may be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully pro-
tected by the fourth amendment," '22 and may not be searched without
a warrant.
Although neither Chadwick, Sanders nor Robbins involved a
search incident situation, 123 their rationales should still apply to
container searches incident to arrest. Indeed, the Court has continu-
ously asserted that a person's expectation of privacy in a container is
the same whether the container is found in a car or elsewhere.124 From
this it follows that a person's expectation of privacy in a container
should also be the same whether that person is under arrest or not. In
fact, the Chadwick Court explicitly ruled that an arrest does not dimin-
ish an arrestee's expectation of privacy interest in containers. 25
Therefore, the rationales from Robbins, Chadwick and Sanders re-
quired the Belton Court to invalidate the warrantless search of Belton's
jacket. Clearly, Belton's jacket was a repository of personal effects ex-
hibiting a legitimate expectation of privacy against warrantless govern-
which there was probable cause to believe that the item could be found.
Ross represents a marked change in the Supreme Court's view with respect to
container searches pursuant to the automobile exception. The decision specifi-
cally rejects Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion) and
explicitly overrules that portion of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
which prohibited the type of search sanctioned in Ross. United States v. Ross,
102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). However, the Ross decision is in keeping with Belton's
holding concerning container searches. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460-61 (1981). Both decisions illustrate that the Supreme Court has changed its
previous stance and is taking a much more permissive view towards warrantless
container searches when vehicles are involved.
121. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424-25 (1981) (plurality opinion), rejected,
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
122. 453 U.S. at 427. The Court's examples of the type of containers that would reveal
their contents to plain view included a kit of burglar tools or a gun case. Id ; see
also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979), overruled in part,
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
123. All three decisions involved container searches subject to the automobile excep-
tion. See supra note 47. Belton dispensed with the rationale from all three deci-
sions for this very reason. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
124. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424-25 (1981) (plurality opinion), re-
jected, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 766 (1979), overruled in part, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157
(1982); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
125. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977), where the Court noted
that "[U]nlike searches of the person . . . searches of possessions [referring to
containers] within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any re-
duced. . .[expectation] of privacy caused by the arrest." Id
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mental intrusions. 26 In fact, the Be/ton Court recognized such clothing
to be a container protected by the fourth amendment.1 27 However, the
Be/ton Court permitted the search of Belton's jacket because he was
under arrest,1 28 disregarding the fact that Belton's expectation of pri-
vacy was in no way diminished because of his arrest. 12 9
The Court also dangerously expanded the rationale of United
States v. Robinson 130 to justify the search of Belton's jacket. The ma-
jority interprets Robinson's holding to permit the search of containers
in a vehicle in which the arrestee was a recent occupant.' 3 ' However,
this interpretation appears incorrect. In analyzing the Robinson deci-
sion, it becomes apparent that its holding only applies to the search of a
container found on an arrestee's person; the decision does not permit
the warrantless search of a container found in the area within an arres-
tee's control. 132 Therefore, the Be/ton Court has unjustifiably extended
the Robinson rationale, disregarding the limitations that Robinson im-
pliedly proscribed as to such an extension.
VII. CONCLUSION
In New York v. Be/ton, 133 the Supreme Court ruled that an officer
may search, incident to the lawful, custodial arrest of the recent occu-
pants of an automobile, the passenger compartment of the vehicle and
any open or closed containers therein.' 34 The rule that Belton eluci-
dates exhibits the Court's endeavor to establish a "bright-line rule" for
the search incident exception in an attempt to make law enforcement
more standardized and efficient. 35 However, in the process of creating
this rule, the Supreme Court has substantially expanded the spatial and
temporal limitations prescribed by Chimel v. California. 136 Moreover,
the Court upheld a search into areas and containers that the arrestees
126. A jacket is a container that one might keep money, papers or jewelry in, and
therefore exhibit a legitimate expectation of privacy in those contents.
127. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981).
128. See id at 461.
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
131. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981).
132. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 235 (1973); see also United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977). The Chadwick Court pointed out
that Robinson's rationale only applies to the search of the person of the arrestee
and not to the area within the arrestee's immediate control. Id. Chadwick also
noted that an arrestee's expectation of privacy interest in containers is not dimin-
ished by the arrest. Id See generally 2 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.3, at 417 n.56 (1978). La Fave points
out that the Robinson holding only applies to the search of the person, and that
the Court took great care to distinguish its holding from other searches incident to
arrest.
133. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
134. Id at 460-61.
135. Id at 463 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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could not possibly have reached at the time of the search. The Belton
decision leaves too many unanswered questions, and more importantly,
because the new rule abandons the justifications underlying Chime, it
offers no guidance with which law enforcement officials may work out
the answers for themselves. The Court exchanges the sound, workable
rule in Chimel, which offered adequate guidance for determining the
constitutionality of warrantless searches incident to arrest, for a
"bright-line rule" to be uniformly applied even though, in many cases,
the factual circumstances will not exist for reasonably allowing such a
warrantless search.
The Belton decision also affords officers the right to search con-
tainers found in the passenger compartment of a vehicle an arrestee
recently occupied. In allowing such a search, the Supreme Court to-
tally disregards the fact that a person exhibits the same legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in a container whether he is under arrest or not.
The majority proclaims that a lawful custodial arrest justifies any in-
fringement of a privacy interest an arrestee might have. However, the
Court arrives at this conclusion by an erroneous application of the
Robinson decision and an interpretation of the fourth amendment that
can only be construed to mean that the amendment permits the unrea-
sonable searching of arrestees. Although the reasoning behind the Bel-
ton rule is not without merit, its practical application establishes a
dangerous precedent which substantially expands the permissible scope
and intensity of the search incident exception. This expansion marks a
serious erosion of the fourth amendment protections afforded to
arrestees.
Michael Gallerizzo
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